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ABSTRACT 
We describe major enhancements to the missile defense planning aid “JOINT 
DEFENDER” (JDEF).  JDEF is the first system that shows how to evaluate and exploit 
new and anticipated improvements in interceptors, long-range surveillance and tracking 
capabilities, networked communications, and the ability of detecting platforms to cue 
intercepting ones downrange.  We want to improve system-wide effectiveness, gauged 
here by the reduction of expected damage inflicted.  We defend an asset list (DAL) of 
targets, characterized by their locations and values to us.  Our defenders include pure 
“LOOKERs,” radars and sensors of enemy missile launches, and “SHOOTERs,” 
platforms with means to both detect and intercept enemy launches.  JDEF optimally 
positions platforms that can be moved, and prescribes what each platform should do.  
JDEF can estimate the value to either opponent of secrecy, deception, or intelligence.  
JDEF is the only missile defense planning system using formal optimization.  Among 
many advantages this conveys, JDEF is able to unambiguously quantify the difference 
among disparate plans.  Although the JDEF planner can manually control any detail, the 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. THE JDEF MODEL....................................................................................................3 
A. JDEF MATHEMATICAL DEVELOPMENT..............................................3 
B. FORMULATION.............................................................................................4 
1. Indices and Index Sets .........................................................................4 
2. Data [units] ...........................................................................................5 
3. Variables [units] ...................................................................................6 
C. FORMULATION OF JDEF MIN-MAX (JD-MINMAX) ...........................7 
D. SOLVING JD-MINMAX WITH JD INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM 
(JD-ILP) ............................................................................................................9 
E. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND GRAPHICAL USER 
INTERFACE..................................................................................................11 
F. USER INPUT AND OUTPUT ......................................................................12 
III. LONG-RANGE SEARCH AND TRACK EXTENSIONS OF THE JDEF 
MODEL ......................................................................................................................17 
A. ENHANCEMENTS TO JDEF .....................................................................17 
B. RADAR EQUATIONS ..................................................................................17 
C. JDEF LOOKERS AND SHOOTERS ..........................................................22 
1. Implementation of Cuing ..................................................................22 
2. The Value of a LOOKER Cue ..........................................................22 
3. Interceptor Performance in JDEF ...................................................25 
D. MATHEMATICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOOKERS AND 
SHOOTERS....................................................................................................26 
1. Indices and Index Sets .......................................................................26 
2. Data [units] .........................................................................................26 
3. Variables [units] .................................................................................26 
4. Formulation ........................................................................................26 
E. MODIFICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF LOOKERS AND SHOOTERS...28 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUTPUTS.......................................................................................31 
A. SCENARIO BACKGROUND ......................................................................31 
B. A SMALL ILLUSTRATIVE NORTH KOREAN SCENARIO................31 
1. Attacker Launch Sites and Missiles .................................................31 
2. Defender List ......................................................................................32 
3. Defended Asset List............................................................................32 
4. Candidate Defender Positions...........................................................32 
5. A Baseline JDEF Solution with no LOOKER.................................33 
6. The Contribution of a LOOKER......................................................35 
C. THE INCREMENTAL VALUE OF CUING IN A THEATER-WIDE 
SURPRISE ATTACK....................................................................................37 
1. Attacker Launch Sites and Missiles .................................................37 
2. Defender List ......................................................................................38 
viii 
3. Defended Asset List with Asset Values ............................................39 
4. Scenario Conduct and Results ..........................................................39 
5. The JDEF Greedy Case Shows How Launch Fans Can Be 
Generated and Used for Defense Positioning ..................................41 
6. The JDEF Two-Sided Case Shows How Secrecy and Deception 
Can Help .............................................................................................42 
7. Evaluating high Cue Values..............................................................45 
V. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS AND RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES ....................................................................................................47 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................47 
B. EARTH CURVATURE VERSUS RADAR DETECTION .......................48 
C. MISSILE KINEMATICS..............................................................................48 
D. RADAR RESOURCES VERSUS RADAR OBSERVABLE AREAS ......48 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................51 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................53 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The JDEF User Interface. ................................................................................11 
Figure 2. The Setup Screen .............................................................................................13 
Figure 3. The Inputs Screen Displaying the Values of a Defended Asset List ...............14 
Figure 4. The JDEF Dashboard.......................................................................................15 
Figure 5. Nomograph of Signal-to-Noise (S/N) Ratio as a Function of Probability of 
Detection (Pd) and Probability of False Alarm Rate (Pf). ................................19 
Figure 6. Radar Parameter Settings.  . .............................................................................28 
Figure 7. Attacker Missile Inventory, Ranges, and Radar Cross Section.. .....................29 
Figure 8. Radar Detection Ranges for Missile Group Radar Cross Sections..................30 
Figure 9. JDEF Minimal North Korean Scenario With No LOOKER. ..........................33 
Figure 10. The Minimal North Korean Scenario Solution Summary with No 
LOOKER Assigned.  . .....................................................................................34 
Figure 11. JDEF Minimal North Korean Scenario Results with one DDG LOOKER. . ..36 
Figure 12. Expected Damage as a Percentage of Total Target Value on the Defended 
Asset List (DAL), Versus Number of LOOKERs Assigned.  ........................40 
Figure 13. A JDEF “Greedy” Plan Permits Each Enemy Launch Site to Launch Every 
Available Missile Attacking its Best Target. ...................................................42 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Estimated Radar Cross Sections.. ....................................................................20 
Table 2. Probability of Negation (Pn) Conditioned by the Value of a Long-Range 
Search and Track (LRS&T) Poisson Cue. .......................................................24 
Table 3. Sample Cross-Range, Down-Range Table Entries. .........................................25 
Table 4. JOINT DEFENDER Default Radar Parameters. .............................................28 
Table 5. Attacker Locations for a Minimal Attack Scenario. ........................................31 
Table 6. Defenders and Initial Position Assignments for a Minimal, Illustrative 
Attack Scenario................................................................................................32 
Table 7. Defended Asset List (DAL). ............................................................................32 
Table 8. Expected Damage of the Joint Defender Objective Function..........................35 
Table 9. Expected Damage with Cuing Added..............................................................36 
Table 10. Launch Sites for a Theater-Wide North Korean Missile Attack..................... 38 
Table 11. Defending Platforms. .......................................................................................38 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AADC  Area Air Defense Commander’s model 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile 
ABL  Airborne Laser 
APL  Applied Physics Laboratory 
AEGIS Not an acronym, rather it is a reference to "The Shield of Zeus" or "Shield  
  of the Gods" in Greek Mythology, now a U.S. Navy shipboard weapon 
  system. 
ASCII  American Standard Code for Interchange of Information 
 
CG  Guided Missile Cruiser 
CPLEX A large-scale mathematical solver, registered trademark of ILOG CPLEX  
  corporation. 
CR/DR Cross-range, down-range table 
 
DAL  Defended Asset List 
DDG  Guided Missile Destroyer 
 
GAMS General Algebraic Modeling System, a registered trademark of GAMS  
  Development Corporation 
GBI  Ground Based Interceptor 
GUI  Graphic User Interface 
 
JDEF  JOINT DEFENDER 
JTF  Joint Task Force 
 
LOOKER Refers to a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense asset with the capability to 
  detect an attack launch. 
LRS&T Long Range Search and Track 
 
NSPD  National Security Presidential Directive 
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Center 
 
PAC-3  Patriot Advanced Capability 
 
RF  Radio Frequency 
 
SHOOTER Refers to a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense asset with the capability to  
  organically intercept an attack launch 
SM-2  Standard Missile 2 
SM-3  Standard Missile 3 
 
THAAD Theater High Altitude Area Defense 
xiv 
TBM  Theater Ballistic Missile 
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
 
VBASIC Visual Basic ©, a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation 
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am deeply grateful to the Professors at the Naval Postgraduate School and in 
particular Adjunct Professor Anton Rowe, Professor Matt Carlyle and Distinguished 
Professor Jerry Brown; without their generous help and direction - this report would not 
exist.  I would also like to thank CAPT (USN retired) Jeff Kline for keeping me in the 
"real world"; his experience and insight were invaluable.  I have also received 
indispensable assistance from the Applied Physics Laboratories at Johns Hopkins 
University, and from the folks at Naval Warfare Development Center; you all have my 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xvii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As of this writing, at least 12 countries either possess Theater Ballistic Missiles 
(TBM's) or are assessed to be actively pursuing technology to acquire such weapons.  
These weapons may be armed with high explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
special-purpose warheads.  National Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-23) orders 
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and 
maintain a ballistic missile defensive capability, and we are developing a global, 
integrated weapon and sensor network to defeat every variant of ballistic missile in flight. 
The United States has not pursued an active Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
capability since signing the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty I (SALT I) and Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties in the early 1970's, so it must develop Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense (TBMD) systems anew.  TBMD weapons systems in procurement 
include the Airborne Laser (ABL), Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), AEGIS Standard 
Missile 3 (SM-3), Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), and Theater High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD).  GBI is a static system intended for initial deployment to Air 
Force Bases in Alaska, California and in central Europe.  The rest of these weapons are 
mobile, intended for rapid deployment to areas of potential conflict.  Detection systems 
include static land-based phased-array search radars, deployable X-band radar afloat, and 
Navy SPY-1 radars associated with the AEGIS weapons system. 
The development of a defensive system of this complexity and scale requires 
completely new tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The individual weapons and sensors 
each have unique capabilities and limitations, and as an integrated defensive system, 
there are myriad tactical memoranda available for their employment.  There are tactical 
aids to optimally station a single defensive unit for best success against single or multiple 
threats.  What about optimal, coordinated stationing of multiple defensive assets?  Our 
platforms are limited in number and we need to take advantage of mutual support, 
maximized probabilities of attack nullification, and best use of tactical data links for 
exchange of targeting data.   
xviii 
This thesis addresses the optimal, coordinated stationing of multiple defensive 
assets of a variety of types in order to maximize their joint effectiveness.  We extend an 
existing planning system “JOINT DEFENDER” (hereafter JDEF).  JDEF was first 
proposed in the March, 2004, Naval Postgraduate School thesis by LT Douglas Diehl 
“How to Optimize Joint Theater Ballistic Missile Defense” and further documented in the 
September, 2005, Operations Research journal article “A Two-Sided Optimization for 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,” by Gerald Brown and others.  The first chapter here 
summarizes this previous work. 
JDEF is not the only decision aid available to mission planners for stationing 
defensive assets; others in use include the Area-Air Defense Commander system 
(AADC) and the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS).  AADC employs a 
greedy, myopic heuristic that protects the defended assets in strict hierarchical order from 
most to least valuable, locating the best first defensive platform and then the second, and 
so forth, until the most important defended asset is protected to an acceptable level, then 
turning to the next defended asset, and so on.  There are only a few AADC super-
computer clusters available for planning, and funding for this program has been curtailed.  
TBMCS displays a planner-provided defensive positioning overlaid by a set of 
preprogrammed launch fans with an output suggesting the relative validity of the plan.  
TBMCS computers are more generally available, for instance in each air operations 
center worldwide.  Neither of these tools uses formal optimization, and thus neither 
provides any qualitative assessment of the overall quality of the plan suggested; hence the 
planner will never know if some other, significantly improved plan remains to be 
discovered. 
We have added cross-range, down-range intercept tables to JDEF identical to 
those used by other planning systems to estimate interceptor performance.  For any 
spherical coordinate engagement triangle defined by launch, target, and interceptor 
location, JDEF interpolates these tables to determine the single-shot kill probability for 
an interceptor fired at an attacking missile. 
We have added radar equations and a library of missile radar cross sections to 
JDEF, so we can emulate, for instance, the AEGIS mission planner.   
xix 
Now that JDEF can determine what can be detected by each radar from each 
position, we can ask JDEF to optimally position LOOKER platforms (i.e., pickets) to 
detect, track, and cue launches for downrange SHOOTER platforms to intercept. 
We present and motivate a mathematical justification for the influence a cue has 
on the kill chain leading to a successful intercept. 
We then show how JDEF optimally positions LOOKERs to surveil potential 
launch locations, how these LOOKERs cue SHOOTERs downrange to increase the 
probability of attack nullification, and how all this can be optimized theater-wide in a 
unified fashion. 
We introduce a graphical user interface for JDEF with which the planner can 
control every detail, every nuance of a theater scenario.  Or, the planner can let JDEF 
optimally advise positioning of defenders, and how to engage attacks, in order to 
minimize expected damage to our defended asset list. 
Two scenarios illustrate how JDEF works.  One, a trivial example, shows how all 
the LOOKER and SHOOTER features interact to prescribe an optimized, unified defense 
plan.  The other example is a large-scale, theater-wide attack that demonstrates how 
JDEF not only suggests where we should position our assets and how we should employ 
them, but also lends insight about our relative strengths and weaknesses, and what we can 
do about them. 
JDEF offers three alternate flavors of planning.  In a “surprise” scenario, the 
enemy launches a set of attacks optimized to achieve maximum expected target damage 
to our defended asset list.  We then mount an optimized defense against this optimal 
attack, seeking to minimize this expected damage.  A “greedy” scenario shows how every 
enemy launch site can attack every target on our defended asset list.  This mathematically 
derives “launch fans” representing every enemy course of action.  Such launch fans are 
used by some contemporary planning methods to plan defenses, so JDEF emulates this by 
placing defending LOOKERs and SHOOTERs in most-advantaged positions to defend 
from as much expected target damage as possible.  Finally, a “two-sided” scenario 
evaluates a conservative case, and a worrisome one, where the enemy can see all our 
xx 
defensive preparations before launching his attacks.  JDEF is the only planning tool today 
that can advise optimal defensive actions in such a disadvantaged situation.  
We show how a LOOKER cue can be used to represent new technologies for fast 
detection, tracking, and automated engagement of missile attacks. 
Finally, we show how JDEF can demonstrate the value of secrecy and deception 
to the defenders.   
JDEF is implemented using Microsoft Excel © and runs on a standard WINTEL 
laptop.  The planner is presented with a geographic display of the area under 
consideration and can manually control any feature via the Excel interface.  However, the 
planner is well-advised to follow the defaults JDEF offers, and to let JDEF optimally 
advise LOOKER and SHOOTER platform positioning and intercept engagements.  
Although there are internal optimization modules, in particular, General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) and one or more licensed solvers --- there is absolutely no 
exposed mathematical detail at all:  The planner needs to know and understand missile 
defense, not mathematical modeling of missile defense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As of this writing, at least 12 countries either possess Theater Ballistic 
Missiles (TBM's) or are assessed to be actively pursuing technology to acquire such 
weapons [Gorwitz 2005].  These weapons may be armed with high explosive, 
chemical, biological, nuclear, or special-purpose warheads.  National Security 
Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-23) orders the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and maintain a ballistic missile 
defensive capability [Bush 2002], and we are developing a global, integrated weapon 
and sensor network to defeat every variant of ballistic missile in flight. 
The United States has not pursued an active Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
capability since signing the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty I (SALT I) and Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties in the early 1970's, so it must develop Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) systems anew.  TBMD weapons systems in 
procurement include the Airborne Laser (ABL), Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI), 
AEGIS Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), and 
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).  GBI is a static system intended for 
initial deployment to Air Force Bases in Alaska, California and in central Europe.  
The rest of these weapons are mobile, intended for rapid deployment to areas of 
potential conflict.  Detection systems include static land-based phased-array search 
radars, deployable X-band radar afloat, and Navy SPY-1 radars associated with the 
AEGIS weapons system. 
The development of a defensive system of this complexity and scale requires 
completely new tactics, techniques, and procedures.  The individual weapons and 
sensors each have unique capabilities and limitations, and as an integrated defensive 
system, there are myriad tactical memoranda available for their employment.  There 
are tactical aids to optimally station a single defensive unit for best success against 
single or multiple threats.  What about optimal, coordinated stationing of multiple 
defensive assets?  Our platforms are limited in number and we need to take advantage 
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of mutual support, maximized probabilities of attack nullification, and best use of 
tactical data links for exchange of targeting data.   
This thesis addresses the optimal, coordinated stationing of multiple defensive 
assets of a variety of types in order to maximize their joint effectiveness.  We extend 
an existing planning system “JOINT DEFENDER” (hereafter JDEF) introduced by 
Diehl [2004] and described by Brown, et. al [2005].  The first chapter here 
summarizes this previous work. 
JDEF is not the only decision aid available to mission planners for stationing 
defensive assets; others in use include the Area-Air Defense Commander system 
(AADC) and the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS).  AADC 
employs a greedy, myopic heuristic that protects the defended assets in strict 
hierarchical order from most to least valuable, locating the best first defensive 
platform, then the second, and so forth, until the most important defended asset is 
protected to an acceptable level, then turning to the next defended asset, and so on.  
There are only a few AADC super-computer clusters available for planning, and 
funding for this program has been curtailed.  TBMCS displays a planner-provided 
defensive positioning overlaid by a set of preprogrammed launch fans with an output 
suggesting the relative validity of the plan.  TBMCS computers are more generally 
available, for instance in each air operations center worldwide.  Neither of these tools 
uses formal optimization, and thus neither provides any qualitative assessment of the 
overall quality of the plan suggested; hence the planner will never know if some 
other, significantly improved plan remains to be discovered. 
In the sections that follow, we show the mathematical modeling underlying 
JDEF, a graphical user interface that makes JDEF easy to use by a planner, not just an 
analyst, new features added to represent radar, and embellishments to the 
optimization that position LOOKER platforms (i.e., pickets) to detect, track, and cue 
launches for downrange SHOOTER platforms to intercept.  We demonstrate with two 
case studies, and show how these can be used to gain insight about the planning 
problem, and new technology proposed to enhance our capabilities in theater ballistic 
missile defense. 
3 
II. THE JDEF MODEL 
A. JDEF MATHEMATICAL DEVELOPMENT 
JDEF is based on a mathematical, two-sided, attacker-defender optimization 
model that seeks to minimize the maximum damage an intelligent enemy can achieve 
(Diehl 2004, Brown et al. 2005).  JDEF assumes prior knowledge of potential enemy 
launch positions, a specific defended asset list (DAL hereafter), and knowledge of 
discrete locations where defending platforms may be positioned.  Defending 
platforms currently include the Navy’s AEGIS-capable ships, Army Patriot Advanced 
Capability (PAC-3) batteries, and ground-based interceptors.  Addition or deletion of 
additional sensors and weapons systems is trivial. 
The attacker controls a set of launch sites, and possesses ,m sfixed missiles of 
type m M∈ pre-positioned at site s, as well as a pool of mmobile  missiles that can be 
transported to any capable receiving launch site.  Transport of the mobile missiles 
may be limited by ,, , m sm smove move .  Launch site s can launch no more than ,m sfixed  
+ mmobile  missiles of type m, and during any planning epoch, can launch at most 
,m slaunches .  We assume an intelligent defender who knows which sites s can accept 
and launch missiles of type m.  The defender guards a set of targets t T∈ , with each 
target t having value tvalue .  An attack a A∈ consists of a launch form site as S∈  of 
a missile of type am M∈ at a target at T∈ .  This attack will hit the target with 
probability aPk , assuming the defender takes no action; aPk  is the probability of kill 
for attack a.  An upper bound tmissiles  may be placed on the number of missiles the 
attacker will launch at target t.  The attacker must decide which missiles to launch at 
which targets to maximize total expected target damage, weighted by target value 
tvalue . 
The defender controls a set of defending platforms p P∈ , each of which is in 
a platform class pc C∈ .  Each platform of class c can be pre-positioned at any one 
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location cg G G∈ ⊆ .  Each platform p carries loadout ,p iloadout  defensive 
interceptors of type i I∈ .  An attack a can be engaged with alternative defensive 
actions d D∈ , where defense d launches , , ,a c d isalvo  interceptors of type(s) i and 
succeeds in thwarting the attack with probability of negation , , ,a c g dPn .  Each 
defensive engagement is conditional.  If attack a is not launched, then any 
interceptors devoted to its engagement are not launched. 
The defender wishes to optimize defensive pre-positioning for attack 
interception while assuming the attacker will observe these preparations and optimize 
attacks to exploit any weaknesses observed in these defenses.  The defender’s 
objective is to minimize the maximum total damage to targets.  We note that this 
model is a conservative one for the defender because the defense is planned against 
the worst possible set of attacks.  JDEF is also conservative for the attacker, because 
it assumes the best possible defense.  However, variants of the model we describe 




The mathematical formulation of JDEF follows: 
1. Indices and Index Sets 
Attacker: 
m M∈  attacking missile types  
s S∈   attacker launch sites 
t T∈   targets, (“defended assets”)  
a A∈   attack launching a missile at a target  
,m sa A A∈ ⊆  attacks launching a missile of type m from site s 
ta A A∈ ⊆  attacks a with target t 
as   launch site of attack ,  aa s S∈  
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 am   missile type launched in attack a, am M∈  
at   target of attack a, at T∈  
Defender: 
p P∈   defending platforms  
c C∈   defending platform classes  
pc   class of platform p, pc P∈   
g G∈   candidate stationing positions for a defending platform  
cg G G∈ ⊆  candidate stationing location for a defending platform 
of class c  
i I∈   defensive interceptor types  
d D∈   defense options  
2. Data [units]  
Attacker: 
,m sfixed  attacker’s total supply of stationary type m missiles at 
  launch site s  
mmobile  attacker’s total supply of mobile missile type m 
,, , m sm smove move  minimum and maximum number of mobile 
missile type m that attacker can transport to launch site 
s 
,m slaunches  maximum launches of missile type m from launch site s 
tmissiles  maximum number of missiles that can attack target t 
tvalue   value of target t 
aPk   probability that attack a hits target t 
Defender: 
,p iloadout  type i interceptors carried by platform p  
  , , ,a c d isalvo  number of type i interceptors  used against attack a by 
     class c platform exercising defense option d 
6 
  pengage  maximum number of engagements platform p can 
manage in a particular time epoch 
  pshoot  maximum number of interceptors platform p can shoot 
in a short period of time 
  , , ,a c g dPn  probability that attack a would is negated if platform p, 
class pc ,in position pcg G∈ exercises defense option d, 
e.g., probability of negation 
 
3. Variables [units]  
 Attacker: 
 ,m sW   type m missiles transported to launch site s 
 ,m sV   total of stationary and mobile type m missiles available 
at launch site s 
aY   1 if attack a is conducted, 0 otherwise 
  (Y the vector of attacks is an “Attack Plan”) 
Defender: 
,p gX   1 if platform p located at g, 0 otherwise 
  , , ,a p g dR   1 if attack a is engaged by platform p from position  
    
pc
g G∈ , exercising defense option d, 0 otherwise 
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( , )X R XR∈ , which we describe in detail below, denotes all feasible pre-
positioning and intercept preparations for the defender. 
The attacker’s objective (A0) expresses total expected target damage, 
assuming a cumulative effect for multiple missiles.  Constraints (A1) limit the 
number of mobile missiles of each type that can be transported to launch sites.  
Constraints (A3) limit the number of missiles that can be launched from each launch 
site.  Constraints (A4) limit the number of missiles that can attack each target.  
Bounds (A5) limit the number of mobile missiles of each type that can be transported 
to each launch site, (A6) the maximum number of missiles that can be launched in 
some limiting planning epoch, and (A7) stipulates binary launch decisions. 
The objective (A0) expresses expected incremental target value damage 
inflicted as a consequence of each attacking missile.  For an area target, such as a city 
or airfield, such a cumulative damage model is standard [e.g. Eckler and Burr 1972].  
But a point target might be destroyed by any single attacking missile, and the lack of 
a joint probability expression for surviving more than one shot means that the attacker 
can “over-credited” with damage value.  (This problem disappears if the attacker can 
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launch no more that one missile at any target, which can be enforced through 
constraints (A4).)  We believe that when it comes to weapons of mass destruction 
carried by TBMs, the damage to an economy and a society will continue to increase 
as the number of successful missile strikes increases.  Thus, the cumulative damage 
model is appropriate, although there might be some diminishing returns to an attacker 
as the number of successful strikes on a target (in a target area) increases. 
The defender’s actions are limited by ( , )X R XR∈ , where XR is defined by 
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Each (D1) limits a platform to occupy at most one grid position, each 
constraint (D2) (optionally) limits a grid position to accommodate at most one 
platform, each constraint (D3) allows at most one interception of each attack, each 
constraint (D4) limits the number of interceptor engagements from each positioned 
platform and grid-point combination, each constraint (D5) (optionally) limits the total 
number of engagements that a platform can conduct in one planning epoch (a discrete 
time period), each constraint (D6) (optionally) limits the total number of interceptors 
that a platform can shoot in a short period of time, each constraint (D7) permits an 
engagement only from an occupied platform and grid-point combination, and 
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constraints (D8) required binary decisions.  Note that constraints (D3) do not require 
a response for every attack.  Indeed, if defenses are overwhelmed, it may be 
impossible to intercept every attack, and we must allow for this eventuality. 
The attacker plans to maximize expected damage, the defender plans to 
minimize the attackers maximum expected damage. 
 
D. SOLVING JD-MINMAX WITH JD INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAM 
(JD-ILP) 
Direct solution of a minimize-maximize integer linear program like JD-
MINMAX is impossible with standard optimization software.  We are fortunate in 
this case however, because; although the attacker’s decision vectors W and V are 
integer, and Y is binary, the constraint matrix involving W, V, and Y is totally 
unimodular [Ahuja et al 1993].  All right-hand side data are integer, thus all solutions 
the linear-programming relaxation of the attacker’s maximizing problem are 
intrinsically integer.  Therefore, we replace constraints 
,,, m,s{ ,..., } m sm sm sW move move∈ ∀  with ,, , ,,m sm s m s m smove W move≤ ≤ ∀ , replace 
,m,s m,s0 V  m slaunches≤ ≤ ∀ , and replace binary constraints {0,1},a aY ∈ ∀  with 
0 1},a aY≤ ≤ ∀ , to create an inner maximization that is a linear program.  We then 
define dual variables for that linear program, take the dual of that inner linear 
maximization to create a “minimize-minimize” problem, which is just a minimizing 
Integer-Linear Program (ILP) and solve that ILP using standard optimization 
software.  This ILP is:  
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 The solution of JD-ILP yields an optimal defense pre-positioning plan X* and 
interceptor-commitment plan R*.  We recover the associated, optimal mobile missile 
transport W* and attack plan Y*, by fixing X=X* and R=R* in JD-MINMAX, and 
solving the linear program that results. 
JD-ILP can be embellished with additional features as long as the 
modifications can be expressed linearly in ( , )X R XR∈  and the embellishments 
respect unimodularity.  E.g., if the embellishments violate the intrinsically integer 
nature of the original model, a special decomposition would likely be required to 
achieve a solution for the enhanced model. 
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E. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE 
The user interface is programmed in Microsoft Visual Basic (VBASIC) © 





Figure 1. The JDEF User Interface.  Planner controls are located at the left.  
The “Dashboard” option places the planner into a geographic (map) view of the 
theater of operations.  The inputs option allows a planner to change any defender, 
defended asset, or attacker parameter to suit the situation. 
 
When “Solve” is invoked, planner-supplied data describing friendly force 
disposition, enemy launch positions, and a defended asset list is converted to an 
ASCII text file, and the interface invokes the JDEF GAMS (General Algebraic 
Modeling System © [2006]) script to import this.  JDEF solves the requested 
planning model(s), providing solution(s) and diagnoses as more text files, and the 
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appropriate parts of those outputs are cataloged back into the spreadsheet.  From 
there, the planner is shown the recommended solution and asked whether or not to 
accept it.  Upon selecting “Accept Solution”, the map slews to include only those 
actions the planner has approved.  The model typically takes one to four minutes to 
arrive at a solution, and once that solution is achieved, geographic display of that 
recommended solution is instantaneous. 
 
F. USER INPUT AND OUTPUT 
The obvious advantage to using Excel as the input shell is that most U.S. 
Officers will be immediately familiar with general operating procedures.  All required 
user input is placed in menu-driven spreadsheet cells and final output is available in 
the same format. 
The planner first selects “New” and is asked to name the scenario and then 
proceed to one of four areas “Dashboard”, “Inputs”, “Outputs”, and “Setup”.  The 
function of each is summarized below. 
“Setup” invites the planner to select a map for the area of interest.  JDEF 
invites the planner to toggle either a “Spreadsheet” mode or “Presentation” mode 
which governs the display of information to the screen.  JDEF output may be 
displayed directly from the user interface via a digital projector or very simply pasted 




Figure 2. The Setup Screen.  This screen allows a planner to set the desired 
display parameters and select which map will be geographically displayed for use 
with the current scenario. 
 
“Inputs” invites the planner to enter and place defensive platforms in starting 
positions.  These positions may be fixed so JDEF cannot change them, or simply 
evaluated by JDEF in the course of its optimization.  This is key: the planner has 




Figure 3. The Inputs Screen Displaying the Values of a Defended Asset List 
(DAL).  This is a slide-bar display of the assigned defended asset values.  By 
convention, we use continuous values in the interval [0,10], but a planner can use any 
values that appeal. 
 
“Dashboard” is a geographic display of the planning area that either shows the 




Figure 4. The JDEF Dashboard.  This is the main geographic display for 
JDEF.  A planner can see enemy launch sites and defended asset positions, as well as 
the current and recommended locations for every defender, and planned interception 
engagements.  The small, empty circles are candidate defender locations, squares 
north-west are North Korean launch sites, circles in South Korea and Japan are 
defended asset locations.  South-east squares denote defender platforms.  Dashed and 
solid lines respectively represent attack launches, and defender engagements.  The 
“Info” button at the lower left opens a window that permits the planner to fly over this 
map and identify any symbol with a mouse click. 
 
“Outputs” displays the best achievable worst-case assessment of what can take 
place based on the underlying mathematical optimization.  Outputs include a solution 
summary, the recommended positioning of defensive assets, and a summary of which 
threats each defensive asset is designated to engage. 
The anticipated JDEF planner is an officer experienced in ballistic missile 
defense, not a mathematical modeler.  The planner is insulated from the internal 
intricacies.  The planner requires no mathematical sophistication or internal 
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III. LONG-RANGE SEARCH AND TRACK EXTENSIONS OF 
THE JDEF MODEL 
A. ENHANCEMENTS TO JDEF 
Radar performance in legacy JDEF has been modeled using an engineering 
approximation that states a threat becomes detectable at distance “X” from the sensor 
location.  We introduce a radar range equation, but one that can be adjusted or 
overridden by the planner.  There has been no provision in legacy JDEF to 
differentiate between a defender platform possessing organic weapons and one whose 
mission is to primarily be a sensor.  We distinguish between a sensor platform, 
referred to hereafter as a “LOOKER” and one that is primarily a “SHOOTER.”  For 
practical purposes, and to isolate the effects of our new modeling paradigm, we 
position the LOOKERs, fix their locations, and then position SHOOTERs that have 
not already been located as LOOKERs.  Our primary focus is the U.S. Navy’s AEGIS 
system, but the planning includes other fixed and mobile detection assets such as 
airborne laser, X-band radar, or deployable ground-based systems. 
 
B. RADAR EQUATIONS 
Several versions of the well-known radar range equation have been considered 
for use in approximating radar performance in JDEF.  Two alternate equations are 
presented here along with the rationale for the one chosen.  We first consider the 
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We rearrange the basic equation to isolate radar cross section over signal-to-
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Then, using generic parameters derived from open sources [Forecast 










σ= × . 
Our equation now establishes a functional relationship between three 
variables: radar cross section of the target, range of the target from the radar, and 
signal-to-noise ratio.   Next, we estimate a reasonably achievable signal-to-noise ratio 
as a function of desired probability of detection and probable false alarm rate (Pfa).  
We adopt a probability of false alarm rate of 10-6 [Knorr 2006] which according to 
Skolnik equates to an average of one false alarm per 15 minutes assuming a clear 
operating environment (e.g., one free of counter-measures). 
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Figure 5. Nomograph of Signal-to-Noise (S/N) Ratio as a Function of 
Probability of Detection (Pd) and Probability of False Alarm Rate (Pf) [Naval Air 
Warfare Center 1992]  The vertical axis represents a desired probability of detection 
(Pd) and the horizontal a signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio.  The curved lines represent a 
known probability of false alarm (Pfa).  In the example above, the desired Pd = .98, 
the faP  = 10
-6 which implies that the (S/N) ratio is 12 dB. 
 
To achieve a desired 95 percent probability of detection and given Pfa of 10-6, 
we make a pessimistic estimate of 14dB minimum required signal-to-noise-ratio from 






σ= × . 
Actual radar cross sections of potential threat missiles are closely-guarded 
military secrets, so we have made suitable estimates as surrogates for actual data.  
The estimates in Table 1 are from Spick [2001]. 
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F-16 Fighting Falcon  +7  5  54  
B-1B Lancer  0  1  11  
F-18E/F Super Hornet 0  1  11  
Rafale  0  1  11  
Typhoon  -3  0.5  5.5  
AGM-86 ALCM  -6  0.25  2.5  
BGM-109 Tomahawk -13  0.05  0.5  
SR-71 Blackbird  -18  0.015  0.15  
F-22 Raptor  -22  0.0065  0.07  
F-117 Nighthawk  -25  0.003  0.03  
B-2 Spirit  -28  0.0015  0.02  
AGM-129 ACM  -30  0.001  0.01  
Boeing Bird of Prey  -70  0.0000001 0.000008  
 
Table 1. Estimated Radar Cross Sections.  From Spick [2001]. 
 
We choose the table estimate for an AGM- 86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile as 
an example with corresponding radar cross section of 0.25m2 (-6 dBsm).  Our radar 
equation now appears: 




= × ≈ . 
This equation represents an optimistic estimate of the maximum likely 
detection range for an object of this size [Skolnik 2001]. 
A second radar equation has been proposed by Applied Physics Laboratory 
(APL) [Loy 2005]: 




  ref_range  Sets range units, kilometers here (1 km), 
  rcs_tgt  Radar Cross Section of the target (decibels/square 
    meter), 
  snr_ref  Reference Signal to Noise Ratio (decibels), 
  snr_thr Threshold Signal to Noise Ratio (decibels), 
  rcs_ref  Reference Radar Cross Section (decibels), and 
unit_conversion_factor converts output to appropriate units. 
 
Using values derived from the example given for Skolnik’s generic radar 
equation, we get: 
(( 6 125 3 3 )/40)10 501dBsm dB dB dB− + − − =  km.  
We have evaluated other radar cross sections as well, all with proportionate 
results.  Depending on the radar cross section used, the APL-recommended equation 
produces results that are about 30 percent more pessimistic than the basic radar 
equation in Skolnik [2001].  After consultations with Professor Jeff Knorr (Naval 
Postgraduate School) and Mr. Todd Loy (APL), we conclude the following.  The 
basic radar equation is a theoretical construct based on physics in a perfect world, 
albeit with provisions made to model noise, etc.  The APL equation is a perturbation 
of the basic radar equation with some provision made for actual ranges experienced in 
the use of various tactical radars.  The reader is invited to vary any or all of the 
parameters used to gain these results.  We chose the APL equation to model radar 
performance in JDEF, because it more closely resembles radar performance in a less-
than-perfect world. 
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C. JDEF LOOKERS AND SHOOTERS 
 
1. Implementation of Cuing 
The military platforms and weapons being developed for TBMD are intended 
to operate in a geographically dispersed manner, some intended to detect launches, 
some to intercept them, and some to do both.  We now develop a scenario where one 
ship or aircraft (LOOKER) would autonomously detect a TBM, transmit that 
detection via digital data link to another ship or aircraft (SHOOTER), which would 
then assume engagement responsibility for that particular threat.  This is referred to 
hereafter as a “cued engagement.” 
In AEGIS lexicon, the implication of a cued engagement is that a ship 
possessing both a radar and TBMD weapons (SHOOTER) would be able to focus 
available radar resources over a set of radar observable areas.  Additional units 
equipped with radar only (LOOKERs) could then surveil a separate set of radar 
observable areas; cuing the SHOOTER when a threat TBM launch is detected. 
For practical reasons, this extension to JDEF is implemented as a sequential 
heuristic.  First, we position the LOOKERs, fix their positions and then re-run the 
optimization to position the SHOOTERs.  This does not guarantee optimality in the 
solution recommended, but we present an analysis of veracity in Chapter 3.  If a 
scenario is presented to JDEF with no LOOKERs available, this is equivalent to using 
legacy JDEF, albeit with much-improved radar detection and engagement fidelity. 
 
2. The Value of a LOOKER Cue 
Complicated systems like missile interceptors rely on a long sequence of 
things going right in order to ultimately be successful.  If Pn is the probability of 
nullification (i.e., engagement success) for such an interceptor system, one might 
imagine that Pn=P1P2…Pn, where Pi is the probability that the ith of n independent 
tasks is accomplished successfully in a kill chain of events.  How do we account for 
an earlier or more accurate designation (cue) of an enemy missile launch that 
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improves one link in this kill chain?  Such an improvement should have the effect of 
increasing Pn, but by exactly how much? 
In reality, the kill chain formula for Pn holds in principle, but neither the 
number of sequential factors nor their specific values are known.  A stochastic model 
of the situation may be our only recourse.  Let X be the number of things that go 
wrong in the kill chain, a random variable that must be 0 if the interceptor system is 
to succeed.  As long as n is known to be large, even if its exact value is unknown, it is 
reasonable on theoretical grounds to think of X as a Poisson random variable.  If the 
mean of X is m, then Pn is the probability that X is 0, which is me− .  If Pn is 0.7, for 
example, then =-ln(0.7)=0.357m .  Now let f be the fraction of things that might go 
wrong that are eliminated by a cue.  X is still Poisson, but its mean is now m(1−f), and 
Pn becomes - (1- )m fe .  If f=0.2 and m=0.357, Then Pn becomes 0.752 (see Table 2).  
Quantitatively accounting for the contribution of a cue is thus reduced to making a 
judgment about f.  One could argue, of course, that one might as well make a 
judgment about Pn in the first place, but f is not simply a “tuning parameter.”  
Parameter f has a well-defined meaning, and judgments about f may therefore be 
more accurate than direct judgments about Pn (Washburn, 2006).  
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  Prior P(N)        
Marginal 0 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 
Value 0.05 0.616 0.664 0.713 0.761 0.809 0.857 0.905 0.952 1 
of a  0.1 0.631 0.679 0.725 0.772 0.818 0.864 0.91 0.955 1 
Cue 0.15 0.648 0.693 0.739 0.783 0.827 0.871 0.914 0.957 1 
 0.2 0.665 0.709 0.752 0.794 0.837 0.878 0.919 0.96 1 
 0.25 0.682 0.724 0.765 0.806 0.846 0.885 0.924 0.962 1 
 0.3 0.699 0.74 0.779 0.818 0.855 0.893 0.929 0.965 1 
 0.35 0.718 0.756 0.793 0.829 0.865 0.9 0.934 0.967 1 
 0.4 0.736 0.772 0.807 0.842 0.875 0.907 0.939 0.97 1 
 0.45 0.755 0.789 0.822 0.854 0.885 0.915 0.944 0.972 1 
 0.5 0.775 0.806 0.837 0.866 0.894 0.922 0.949 0.975 1 
 0.55 0.795 0.824 0.852 0.879 0.905 0.93 0.954 0.977 1 
 0.6 0.815 0.842 0.867 0.891 0.915 0.937 0.959 0.98 1 
 0.65 0.836 0.86 0.883 0.904 0.925 0.945 0.964 0.982 1 
 0.7 0.858 0.879 0.899 0.917 0.935 0.952 0.969 0.985 1 
 0.75 0.88 0.898 0.915 0.931 0.946 0.96 0.974 0.987 1 
 0.8 0.903 0.918 0.931 0.944 0.956 0.968 0.979 0.99 1 
 0.85 0.926 0.937 0.948 0.958 0.967 0.976 0.984 0.992 1 
 0.9 0.95 0.958 0.965 0.972 0.978 0.984 0.99 0.995 1 
 0.95 0.975 0.979 0.982 0.986 0.989 0.992 0.995 0.997 1 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 2. Probability of Negation (Pn) Conditioned by the Value of a Long-
Range Search and Track (LRS&T) Poisson Cue.  For instance, an LRS&T cue of 
0.20 conditions (raises) a Pn of 0.700 to 0.752.  This displays the influence of an 
LRS&T cue on reducing the Poisson uncertainty in a kill chain leading to a successful 
intercept.  Such a cue relieves the intercepting platform from the distractions of initial 
detection and track of a missile launch, enabling this platform to concentrate attention 
and resources on just the intercept.  If we call the entries in the first row Pn(cue=0), 
then every other row is computed Pn(cue|Pn(0))=exp(log(Pn(0))*(1-cue)). 
 
JDEF applies a cue factor f that varies by LOOKER class, radar type, and 
radar cross section of an attacking missile. 
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3. Interceptor Performance in JDEF 
The performance of defensive interceptors in JDEF is expressed by a cross-
range, down-range table (CR/DR Table). One example of a CR/DR table entry is 
displayed at Table 3.  The parameters used in this document are theoretical constructs 
derived from open sources but may be changed per the planner’s requirements. 
 
Missile Interceptor Distance Min Dr Max Dr Min Cr Max Cr Prob 
NoDong1 SM-3 50 375 9999 30 375 0.700 
NoDong1 SM-3 1500 375 9999 30 375 0.700 
 
Table 3. Sample Cross-Range, Down-Range Table Entries.  The “Missile” 
column denotes an attacking missile type, “Interceptor” the defending missile type, 
and “Distance” the length of a downrange attack track.  Given these, “Min Dr,” “Max 
Dr,” Min Cr,” and “Max Cr” give limits on the relative position of an interceptor 
launch that can achieve the single-shot kill “Prob” (Pssk) shown.  The notional rows 
shown here are for a NoDong1 attack track length of 50 and 1,500 km.  If an SM-3 
interceptor is fired from no further than 375 km and no closer than 30 km to the 
launch track, and from at least 375 km downrange from the NoDong1 launch point, it 
has a Pssk of 0.700.  Not shown are additional limitations of the SM-3 that govern 
exactly where in the attack track we can achieve an exo-atmospheric kinetic kill.  In 
general, for any missile-interceptor pair, there will be hundreds of entries like this 
from minimum to maximum attack track distance.  JDEF interpolates the proximate 
entries for each single-shot probability of kill. 
 
Each pairing of attack missile and defending interceptor has its own set of 
cross-range, down-range table entries.  For an attack launch from some launch site to 
a target location, and from each defender position, JDEF evaluates the spherical 
engagement triangle and interpolates from these table entries to determine whether 
the interceptor can be used, and how well it will work.  All these table entries are 
open to manual editing by the planner. 
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D. MATHEMATICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LOOKERS AND 
SHOOTERS 
 
To position LOOKERs, we embellish the optimization presented in Chapter I 
with the following new notation. 
1. Indices and Index Sets 
 Defender: 
 ,p gs S∈  observable launch sites by platform p at location g 
,p gm M∈  observable launch missiles by platform p at location g 
 , ,s m ta A∈  attacks from launch site s by missile m at target t 
2. Data [units] 
 pmax_surveils maximum launch sites platform p can surveil 
3. Variables [units] 
 Defender: 
 , ,p g sQ   1 if platform p at location g surveils launch site s,  
 0 otherwise [binary] 
 4. Formulation 
 
, , ,
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Each constraint (L1) requires that platform p be located in position g before it 
can surveil launch site s from there.  Each constraint (L2) limits radar detection by 
platform p at position g of a candidate launch of missile m from launch site s unless 
that launch can be detected and the launch site is surveiled.  Each constraint (L3) 
limits the number of launch sites a platform p can simultaneously observe from 
location g:  This represents radar hardware and software limitations.  Domain 
restriction (L4) requires observation decisions to be binary.  Any particular launch 
site may be surveiled by more than one platform. 
This modification positions LOOKER platforms, selects a set of candidate 
launch sites to surveil, and devotes radar resources to detect any launches from the 
surveiled sites to cue shooters. 
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E. MODIFICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF LOOKERS AND SHOOTERS 
 
 
Figure 6. Radar Parameter Settings.  This window allows the planner to alter 
default radar engineering parameters.  The values required are Signal-to-Noise (S/N) 
ratio reference, (S/N) ratio threshold, Radar Cross Section (RCS) reference, and units 
constant (RDR Dcn).  These values may be left at, or restored to default values with 
the “Defaults” button.  The “Apply” button invokes the radar equation to generate 
detection ranges for a library of standard reference radar cross sections of attacking 
missiles. 
 
A “defaults” option restores radar constants to a set of default values shown in 
Table 4. 
 
Reference Range 1 km 
Target RCS 0 dB 
Reference SNR 115 dB 
Threshold SNR 5 dB 
Reference RCS 0 dB 
Unit Conversion Factor 40 
 
Table 4. JDEF Default Radar Parameters.  These values are the current 
defaults in JDEF and may be restored by the planner with the “defaults” button in the 
JDEF radar constants window. 
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For convenience, threat missiles in JDEF have been aggregated into three 
categories, or missile_groups, that each share a common radar cross section.  These 
are: Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM’s), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles 
(MRBM’s), and Long Range Ballistic Missiles (LRBM’s).  These missile_groups can 
be expressed with higher fidelity, or even stated as each individual missile type.  
Suggested sources of data for unclassified scenario building include FAS [2006], 
UCS [2006], and Jane’s [2006].  Figure 7 shows each North Korean missile type, its 
minimum and maximum range, and its missile group classification for radar cross 
section.  Figure 8 shows the numerical radar cross section for each missile group, and 
the maximum detection range for a SPY-1 radar with current radar equation 
constants.  The constants, or the detection ranges, can be changed by the planner. 
 
Figure 7. Attacker Missile Inventory, Ranges, and Radar Cross Section.  For 
example, JDEF credits North Korea with 200 NoDong1 missiles, each with minimum 
range 1,350 km, maximum range 1,500 km, and the radar cross section of a medium 
range ballistic missile (MRBM).   
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Figure 8. Radar Detection Ranges for Missile Group Radar Cross Sections.  
For example, Using JDEF default radar constants, a medium range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) NoDong1 has a radar cross section of -2dBsm and can be detected by a 
SPY-1 radar at a range of 841 km.  The planner can override these ranges. 
31 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OUTPUTS 
A. SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
 
JDEF applies one of three alternate planning paradigms, which are 
summarized as follows:  
(1) Surprise:  This mode approximates what military planners call “enemy’s 
most dangerous course of action”.  JDEF answers the question, “What is the optimal 
friendly force disposition required to counter the worst possible attack on our 
Defended Asset List (DAL)?” 
(2) Two-Sided:  This mode assumes an intelligent enemy who observes 
defensive preparations and circumvents those preparations. 
(3) Greedy:  This model computes “all possible attacks” and defends as much 
expected target damage as possible from all these. 
 
B. A SMALL ILLUSTRATIVE NORTH KOREAN SCENARIO 
The following tables list the friendly forces, defended assets, and attackers 
involved in this small, illustrative scenario. 
 
1. Attacker Launch Sites and Missiles 
We have chosen three launch sites from unclassified sources (see Table 5).  
These attacker locations and missiles represent a possible short- or no-notice attack 
threat against U.S. interests in Japan. 
 
Name Position NoDong1
Chunggangup 41° 46' N  126° 53' E 4 
Mayang 40° 00' N  128° 11' E 4 
Sangwon 38° 50' N  126° 05' E 4 
 
Table 5. Attacker Locations for a Minimal Attack Scenario.  Each launch 
site here has four NoDong1 missiles. 
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2. Defender List 
Table 6 shows defenders.  The DDG LOOKER has no interceptor missiles, 
but can surveil as many as three launch sites.  SHOOTERs include a DDG and a CG, 
each endowed with six SM-3 interceptors, and a Patriot battery with 16 PAC-3 
interceptors. 
 
Class Looker Shooter Surveil Lat Lon SM-3 PAC-3 
DDG x  3 39.16667 130.0333 0   
DDG  x   40.56667 133.95 6   
CG   x   36.61667 130 6   
Patriot   x   33.36667 129.8667   16 
 
Table 6. Defenders and Initial Position Assignments for a Minimal, 
Illustrative Attack Scenario.  The DDG LOOKER has no interceptor missiles, but 
can surveil as many as three launch sites.  SHOOTERs include a DDG and a CG, 
each endowed with six SM-3 interceptors, and a Patriot battery with 16 PAC-3 
interceptors. 
 
3. Defended Asset List 
Table 7 shows the values we assign to each defended asset.  
Name Position Value
Yokosuka 35° 17' N  139° 40' E 9 
Sasebo 33° 09' N  129° 43' E 8 
Misawa 40° 41' N  141° 20' E 7 
 
Table 7. Defended Asset List (DAL).  This shows the name, location and 
value of each defended asset. 
 
4. Candidate Defender Positions 
JDEF allows the planner to nominate any number of feasible defender 
locations as potential stations as shown in Figure 4.  In this scenario, 17 potential 
locations are nominated for seaborne assets and 15 potential locations for the Patriot 
battery ashore.  Here, we place these arbitrarily across the Sea of Japan, the Japanese 
Islands, and the South Korean peninsula. 
33 
5. A Baseline JDEF Solution with no LOOKER 
Our first iteration has no LOOKER. and three SHOOTERs.  This exercises 
JDEF in a manner identical to its legacy form, giving us a baseline for comparison of 




Figure 9. JDEF Minimal North Korean Scenario With No LOOKER.  
Square icons in North Korea represent potential launch sites.  Square icons south-east 
represent a cruiser, a destroyer, and a Patriot Battery placed in positions 
recommended by JDEF.  Each dashed line represents an attack launch, and each solid 
line denotes a defender interception.  The “Info” button at the lower left opens a 
window that permits the planner to fly over this map and identify any symbol with a 
mouse click. 
 






Figure 10. The Minimal North Korean Scenario Solution Summary with No 
LOOKER Assigned.  This is the summary page that displays the number of attacks 
launched, the number of attacks that JDEF is able to successfully intercept, and the 
expected damage to targets on our Defended Asset List (DAL). 
 
The expected damage to each attacked target on our Defended Asset List 
(DAL) is computed as the product of that target value and the probability that the 
attack succeeds, even if we try to intercept it.  We conservatively assume that the 












Yokosuka 9 SM-3 0.7 1 2.7 
Sasebo 8 PAC-3 0.8 1 1.6 
Misawa 7 SM-3 0.7 1 2.1 
Totals 24    6.4 
 
Table 8. Expected Damage of the JDEF Objective Function.  For example, 
the expected damage to Yokosuka above is 2.7 units based on an original asset value 
of 9.0, an assumed attacking missile probability of kill (Pk) of 1, and a probability of 
negation by our interception (Pn) of 0.7. 
 
6. The Contribution of a LOOKER 
The precise definition of a “cue” varies.  A cue might include anything from a 
voice report to an automated threat detection triggering automated, electronic firing 
orders and resulting in a fully-automatic, remote interceptor launch.  JDEF can now 
represent any such cue, expressed mathematically as a fraction that exponentially 
increases the probability of negation achieved by the cued SHOOTER.  We use 
unclassified, notional numerical values of these cues.  These values can be changed 
by the planner to represent fleet engineering data, expert judgment, or alternate 
estimates of performance of new technology. 
We now activate the DDG LOOKER (the ship in Table 6 with no 
interceptors), and rerun the same scenario (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. JDEF Minimal North Korean Scenario Results with one DDG 
LOOKER.  The DDG LOOKER is the square icon positioned southeast of Mayang 
(upper-left most of the defenders) and features three lines representing detection and 
cuing of all three enemy launches. 
 
We now assume a marginal cue value of 0.20 and amplify Pn’s based on the 
values displayed in Table 2.  The LOOKER cues reduce expected target damage from 









Yokosuka 9 SM-3 0.7 0.739 2.35 
Sasebo  8 PAC-3 0.8 0.818 1.46 
Misawa 7 SM-3 0.7 0.739 1.83 
Totals 24    5.64 
 
Table 9. Expected Damage with Cuing Added.  The LOOKER cues an attack 
on each of these targets, and the interception of each attack has its probability of 
nullification (Pn) amplified by that cue as shown.  Expected damage is reduced from 
6.40 to 5.64. 
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C. THE INCREMENTAL VALUE OF CUING IN A THEATER-WIDE 
SURPRISE ATTACK 
Our next scenario examines the value of incrementally increasing the number 
of LOOKERs in a robust, theater-wide, North Korean surprise-attack scenario.  We 
generate a scenario with 12 potential attackers, two CGs, four DDGs, three Patriot 
Batteries and one THAAD Battery.  The DDGs have no interceptor missiles, and are 
added incrementally in successive iterations as LOOKERs. 
 
1. Attacker Launch Sites and Missiles 
In Table 10 below, we expand the number of launch sites, and the variety of 
attacker missiles.  In this scenario, we limit the number of attacks coming from each 
launch site to one per attacking missile type per planning time epoch.  E.g., only one 
Scud B can be prepared and launched from Chihari, only one NoDong1, etc., but 
these can all be prepared and launched simultaneously. 
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Chihari 38° 37' N  126° 41' E 15 20 10    
Chunggangup 41° 46' N  126° 53' E   10 10    
Kanggamchan 40° 24' N  125° 12' E   15 10    
Kanggye 40° 07' N  126° 35' E   15 10    
Mangyongdaeri 38° 59' N  125° 40' E 10 20 10    
Mayang 40° 00' N  128° 11' E   15 20 1 1 
Namgungni 39° 08' N  125° 46' E 5 15 15    
NoDong 40° 50' N  129° 40' E   5 15 1 1 
Okpyong 39° 17' N  127° 18' E 15 15 10    
Paegun 39° 58' N  124° 35' E   15 10    
Pyongyang 39° 00' N  125° 45' E 15 15 10    
Sangwon 38° 50' N  126° 05' E 15 20 10    
Sunchon 39° 25' N  125° 55' E 5 15 10    
Tokchon 39° 45' N  126° 15' E 5 15 15    
Toksong 40° 25' N  128° 10' E 5 15 15    
Yongodong 41° 59' N  129° 58' E     20 1 1 
 
Table 10. Launch Sites for a Theater-Wide North Korean Missile Attack.  
This list of launch sites includes the location, type, and quantity of each potential 
attacking missile.  Attacks are limited to a single launch per attacking missile type per 
time epoch in this scenario. 
 
2. Defender List 
Table 11 shows our defenders.  The LOOKERs are introduced one at a time to 
see what contribution they make to the overall effectiveness of missile defense. 
 
Class Looker Shooter Surveil Engage Launch SM-3 PAC-2 PAC-3 HTK 
CG  X  5 10 30     
CG  X  5 10 30     
Patriot  X   4 8   6 32   
Patriot  X   4 8   6 32   
Patriot  X   4 8   6 32   
Thaad  X   4 8     10 
DDG X  3 2 4  0      
DDG X  3 2 4 0     
DDG X  3 2 4 0     
DDG X   3 2 4 0       
 
Table 11. Defending Platforms.  DDG LOOKERS have no interceptors.  
SHOOTER platforms are endowed with the interceptor loadouts shown. 
 
39 
3. Defended Asset List with Asset Values 
Table 12 shows our defended asset list with locations and associated asset 
values. 
Name Location Value
Seoul 37° 33' N  126° 59' E 6.9 
Pusan 35° 05' N  129° 06' E 9.4 
Inchon 37° 30' N  126° 38' E 6.9 
Chinhae 35° 08' N  128° 38' E 8.9 
Osan 37° 05' N  127° 02' E 4.8 
Kunsan 35° 55' N  126° 37' E 4.9 
Tokyo 35° 40' N  139° 46' E 9.9 
Yokosuka 35° 17' N  139° 40' E 9.1 
Sasebo 33° 09' N  129° 43' E 8.9 
Okinawa 26° 12' N  127° 41' E 8.1 
Misawa 40° 41' N  141° 20' E 8.2 
Atsugi 35° 27' N  139° 21' E 7.7 
 
Table 12. Defended Asset List.  This shows the name, location and value of 
every target on our defended asset list for a theater-wide attack scenario. 
 
 
4. Scenario Conduct and Results 
We begin with no LOOKERS. 
Iteration 0, No LOOKERs: North Korea can only reach ten of twelve targets 
on our DAL, Misawa and Atsugi are spared.  A Patriot battery intercepts SCUDB’s 
aimed at Seoul, Inchon, and Osan, another Patriot battery intercepts SCUDC’s aimed 
at Pusan and Chinhae, the third Patriot intercepts a SCUDC aimed at Sasebo.  Thaad 
intercepts a NoDong1 aimed at Yokosuka, and the CG’s each intercept NoDong1s 
respectively aimed at Tokyo and Okinawa.  Nine of 10 attacks are intercepted, and 
Kunsan is struck by a leaker.  The expected damage is 16.7 of 93.7 (17.8%). 
 Iteration 1, One LOOKER:  The LOOKER surveils Chihari, Kanggamchan, 
and Pyongyang, five of 10 attacks are cued.  There is still one leaker striking Kunsan, 
but the expected damage decreases to 15.79 of 93.7 (16.9%), due to the marginal 
contribution of the cues. 
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Iteration 2, Two LOOKERs:  One LOOKER surveils Chihari, Paegun, and 
Sangwon, the other surveils Kanggamchan, NoDong, and Pyongyang.  Eight of ten 
attacks are cued.  Kunsan is still struck by a leaker, and expected damage decreases to 
15.39 of 93.7 (16.4%). 
Iteration 3, Three LOOKERs:  All ten attacks are cued, Kunsan is still struck 
by a leaker, and expected damage decreases to 15.32 of 93.7 (16.4%). 
There is no value added by introducing additional LOOKERs beyond these 
three because each attack is already being surveiled and cued.  Regardless of what 
marginal values are chosen for cued engagements, the objective function will remain 
constant once all engagements are cued. 
 




















Figure 12. Expected Damage as a Percentage of Total Target Value on the 
Defended Asset List (DAL), Versus Number of LOOKERs Assigned.  LOOKER 
cues reduce expected damage, but additional LOOKERs contribute diminishing 
returns, with no return at all for four or more 
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5. The JDEF Greedy Case Shows How Launch Fans Can Be 
Generated and Used for Defense Positioning 
Figure 13 shows what happens when we ask JDEF for a “greedy” plan for our 
scenario.  A greedy plan permits each enemy launch site to launch every available 
missile attacking its best target.  The resulting “launch fans” illustrate the reach of 
such an enemy course of action.  Defending LOOKER and SHOOTER platforms are 
positioned to protect against the maximal expected target damage.  Here, five DDG 
LOOKERs cue SHOOTERs including three CGs, three Patriot batteries, and a Thaad 
battery.  This “greedy” planning mode mathematically emulates manual placement of 
defenders to “cover enemy launch fans” used by, for instance, Theater Battle 





Figure 13. A JDEF “Greedy” Plan Permits Each Enemy Launch Site to 
Launch Every Available Missile Attacking its Best Target.  The resulting “launch 
fans” illustrate the reach of such an enemy course of action.  Defending LOOKER 
and SHOOTER platforms are positioned to protect against the maximal expected 
target damage.  Here, five DDG LOOKERs cue SHOOTERs including three CGs, 
three Patriot batteries, and a Thaad battery.  This “greedy” planning mode 
mathematically emulates manual placement of defenders to “cover enemy launch 
fans” used by, for instance, Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS). 
 
6. The JDEF Two-Sided Case Shows How Secrecy and Deception 
Can Help 
The JDEF two-sided case introduced by Diehl [2004] and amplified by 
Brown, et. al [2005], assumes the enemy will observe our defensive preparations 
before launching his attacks.  This is a conservative case, and a worrisome one.  
Ground-based missile batteries and their supporting radars and equipment are hard to 
hide, especially given that Patriots are most advantageously located very near our 
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defended assets.  A ship using a SPY-1 radar can make no secret of this, and thus 
reveals its presence if not a telltale of its position. 
To illustrate, we use a “surprise” case as a baseline.  We deploy three AEGIS 
DDG LOOKERs, and SHOOTERs including three AEGIS CGs, three Patriot 
batteries and a Thaad battery.  All these defenders are hidden from the enemy 
(“secret” in JDEF parlance). 
The enemy launches three NoDong1, three SCUDB, and four SCUDC 
missiles.  Two defended assets escape attack because they are not in range of any 
attacking missile from any potential launch site.  Assuming (as we do) each attacking 
missile hits its target if not intercepted, expected damage from this attack is 83.0% of 
our defended asset value. 
Our LOOKERs detect, track, and cue all ten attacks.  A CG intercepts a 
NoDong1 aimed at Tokyo, another CG intercepts one aimed at Okinawa, the Thaad 
intercepts a NoDong1 aimed at Yokosuka, a single Patriot battery intercepts three 
SCUDBs aimed at Seoul, Inchon, and Osan, another Patriot intercepts two SCUDCs 
aimed at Pusan and Chinhae, and the third Patriot intercepts a SCUDC aimed at 
Sasebo.  A SCUDC leaker hits Kunsan.  See Figure 14. 




Figure 14. JDEF “Surprise” Baseline Case.  The enemy launches three 
NoDong1, three SCUDB, and four SCUDC missiles.  Two defended assets escape 
attack because they are not in range of any attacking missile from any potential 
launch site.  Assuming (as we do) each attacking missile hits its target if not 
intercepted, expected damage from this attack is 83.0% of our defended asset value if 
we do not mount a defense.  Our LOOKERs detect, track, and cue all 10 attacks.  A 
CG intercepts a NoDong1 aimed at Tokyo, another CG intercepts one aimed at 
Okinawa, the Thaad intercepts a NoDong1 aimed at Yokosuka, a single Patriot 
battery intercepts three SCUDBs aimed at Seoul, Inchon, and Osan, another Patriot 
intercepts two SCUDCs aimed at Pusan and Chinhae, and the third Patriot intercepts a 
SCUDC aimed at Sasebo.  A SCUDC leaker hits Kunsan.  Defenders reduce expected 
damage to about 16.4%. 
 
We now make all defenders visible (“seen” in JDEF parlance).  When we do 
this, expected damage increases from 16.4% to 76.2%. 
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We now make all defenders visible (“seen” in JDEF parlance).  When we do 
this, expected damage increases from 21% to 76%. 
How did this happen?  The enemy, observing our preparations, decides not to 
launch five of its NoDong1 missiles that we would certainly intercept (we call such 
instances “blocked” shots).  He does launch one NoDong1 that we intercept and nine 
SCUDs, every one of which leaks through our seen defenses to its target. 
The only defensive weapon we have that is effective against SCUD attacks is 
Patriot.  With only three Patriot batteries, all seen by the enemy, and 12 targets to 
defend, he just shoots around us. 
Making our ships “secret,” and leaving ground units “seen” is of scant help.  
Expected damage moderates from 76% to about 62%.  The enemy launches three 
NoDong1 missiles, and our ships intercept these.  Seven SCUDs are launched and 
leak. 
You can see from these excursions that secrecy is of great value to the 
defender.   
We can also use JDEF to evaluate deception by creating “seen” defenders that 
have no real ability to detect, track, cue, or intercept at all.  JDEF can show how to 
position these “dummy defenders” to frustrate and weaken enemy attack plans. 
 
7. Evaluating high Cue Values 
As we have seen, intercepting SCUDs still presents a challenge.  Patriot 
terminal defenders are the only purpose-built interceptors effective against SCUD.  
While we can possibly use a sea-based interceptor such as an upgraded SM-2 missile 
against a SCUD, this would require placing the SHOOTER ship very close to the 
attacking missile track.  The downrange flyout time for a SCUD is only a few 
minutes, compressing our window of opportunity to identify, track, cue, and intercept. 
Any new system we build to deal with SCUD, or any similar short-range, low 
altitude attacking missile threat, will have to accommodate extremely short decision 
cycles.  Detect and track will need to be quick, and accurate. 
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We use JDEF to evaluate the influence of better detect-and-track cues.  We 
endow our AEGIS DDG LOOKERs with respective cues of 0.5 for the SRBM 
missile_group radar cross section, 0.6 for MRBM, and 0.7 for LRBM. 
With no LOOKER, and no cue, we intercept nine of 10 attacks with expected 
damage 83% of defended asset value.  With one LOOKER, we cue four launches 
from two surveiled sites.  We intercept only eight of 10 attacks, but expected damage 
drops to 24%.  The cues are so good, we abandon un-cued attacks, the better to 
defend targets we can really protect well. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS AND 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
JDEF now accepts interceptor performance data exactly as it is expressed by 
standard engineering sources, reckons radar performance in a transparent, standard 
fashion, and incorporates LOOKERs to cue SHOOTERs and increase their 
effectiveness.  Every detail, every nuance is completely documented.  All this is 
presented in a graphical user interface, and every parameter is open to planner view 
and control.  JDEF invites the planner to fix any condition, override any default, and 
completely manually control every detail.  JDEF also offers an optimization-based 
mechanism to take partial guidance --- expert judgment and/or exogenous constraints 
--- and follow this while completing a theater-wide, joint missile defense plan in a 
minute or two.  We know of no other planning tool that is documented as well, is as 
open as this to manual editing and control, and is as flexible to follow planner 
guidance, or merely use planner advice as a starting point to complete an optimal 
defense plan. 
JDEF works on a WINTEL laptop.  Cost per seat is about fifteen thousand 
dollars.  All its features can be transported to any other reasonable, contemporary 
computing platform. 
JDEF can be well-used by any planner with missile defense expertise.  The 
only mathematical detail exposed in the graphical user interface is optional, and 
expressed in standard missile defense lexicon.  All the rest of the optimization is 
automated, and no modeling experience is required. 
JDEF is the only missile defense planner extant that provides a qualitative 
guarantee with its solution:  it gives an expected damage, and an upper bound on this, 
and there can be no as-yet undiscovered plan that follows the rules the planner has 
dictated and betters this. 
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B. EARTH CURVATURE VERSUS RADAR DETECTION 
When radar systems operate on or near the earth’s surface and focus a radio 
frequency (RF) energy beam along or near the earth’s surface, that energy is refracted 
along a well-understood path that extends the radar’s range.  This is normally 
accounted for by an approximation called the “four-thirds Earth approximation” 
[Wagner, et. al 1999] that assumes earth radius to be one-third larger than it actually 
is, and renders a more accurate radar range estimate.  JDEF radar targets are ballistic 
missiles with relatively high trajectories that extend into thin to nearly no earth 
atmosphere.  As RF energy propagates into areas of lesser atmospheric concentration, 
refraction wanes to nothing in a vacuum.  One future enhancement would be to 
incorporate this atmospheric radar range gradient into the radar equations for a 
refined estimate of threat detectability 
 
C. MISSILE KINEMATICS 
The US Navy’s SM-3 missile, the US Army’s Theater High Altitude Area 
Defense missile system, and the US Air Force’s Ground Based Interceptor are kinetic 
TBMD weapons that have either been fielded or are in production as of this writing.  
JDEF currently represents the effectiveness of any engagement by one of these 
interceptor missiles by interpolating single-shot kill probability entries in a cross-
range, down-range table.  Future research could model the actual kinematics of 
kinetic TBMD weapons in production. 
 
D. RADAR RESOURCES VERSUS RADAR OBSERVABLE AREAS 
The maximum number of launch sites that any one defensive platform p can 
monitor in JDEF is constrained by the planner-specified limit _ pmax surveils .  The 
maximum number of sites that one radar may surveil is, in reality; a function of radar 
resources available, the state of radar maintenance, and the ranges at which 




of radar-observable launch sites, requiring only the state of radar maintenance as a 
planner input and then calculating the maximum number of radar observable areas 
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